In Agar v. Judy, C.A. No. 9541-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 19), a rare case involving resort to a Delaware statute’s legislative history, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster held that Delaware’s anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed narrowly so as to be applicable only to public petition and participation in land use proceedings, and is not a broad legal protection against defamation claims.
SLAPP refers to “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,” a lawsuit filed in retaliation for speaking out on a public issue or controversy. SLAPP suits were a tactic used by developers against citizens opposing their projects in the course of land use or permitting proceedings. The threat of litigation by developers against their opponents and the associated costs in defending such litigation were intended to chill public participation against proposed development projects by imposing significant costs on any vocal opponents. Anti-SLAPP statutes were a response to the threat posed by SLAPPs and were intended to encourage and protect the exercise of free speech. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. As Laster noted, the scope of these statutes vary widely, with some covering not merely “petition clause” activity, but also “speech clause” activity more generally, providing protection for any acts of free speech or expression on issues of public concern.
